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A computer simulation runs a model generating a phenomenon under investigation.
For the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory.  The model must
be isomorphic to the natural system that realizes the phenomenon.  This paper elaborates
the method of assessing a simulation's explanatory power.  Then it illustrates the method
by applying it to two simulations in game theory.  The first is Brian Skyrms's (1990)
simulation of interactive deliberations.  It is intended to explain the emergence of a Nash
equilibrium in a noncooperative game.  The second is Skyrms's (2004) simulation of the
evolution of cooperation.  It is intended to explain cooperation in assurance games.  The
final section suggests ways of enhancing the explanatory power of these simulations.
1.  The Explanatory Power of Simulations
A simulation runs a model, in particular, a dynamic model.  Although a model may be
static or dynamic, a simulation runs a model of a process.  Not all simulations have
explanatory goals.  A machine selling train tickets may simulate speech.  A machine
issuing game-board instructions may simulate playing chess.  These simulations succeed
if they produce appropriate behavior.
Some simulations may aim not only to produce an outcome but also to produce it as
nature does.  Simulations that represent an organism's behavior may replicate natural
processes because evolution has optimized production of the behavior.  A machine
simulating speech may replicate human cognitive processes because they efficiently
generate speech.  The simulation's goal may be to produce speech as humans do.  Then it
may combine the goals of producing and explaining speech.
In some cases simulations have a predictive rather than an explanatory goal.  A
simulation of an economic market may aim to predict the market's outcome without
trying to replicate the process that produces it.  A predictive simulation may depart from
nature to implement a reliable shortcut.  However, the goals of prediction and explanation
generally go hand in hand.  Explanatory mechanisms afford the most accurate predictive
devices.1
One evaluates a simulation with respect to a goal, so an evaluation begins by
identifying the goal.  First, what phenomenon does the simulation study?  Simulations of
the emergence a signaling system under various conditions may, for example, examine
the prevalence of signaling systems rather than the process of their emergence.  Second,
does the simulation aim only to reproduce a phenomenon, or also to reproduce the
process behind the phenomenon's natural occurrence?  If it has the latter goal, which
aspects of the process does it seek to replicate?  Does it, for example, try to replicate the
speed of the process?  Third, does the simulation seek to explain the phenomenon?  If so,
then it must replicate components of the natural process that explains the phenomenon.
                                                 
1 Simulations in the social sciences are diverse and raise a variety of interesting philosophical issues.  For a
good introduction, see Rainer Hegselmann, Ulrich Mueller, and Klaus Troitzsch (1996).
2This paper examines simulations that aim to explain a natural phenomenon's
occurrence.  They aim to replicate the process of the phenomenon's occurrence.  The
simulations treat interactive human behavior.  They target Nash equilibrium,
coordination, and cooperation in simultaneous-move games.  Although many simulations
have these goals, the paper focuses on Brian Skryms's computer simulations of
interaction deliberations and of the evolution of social norms.  It presents a standard of
explanatory success and by way of illustration applies it to Skyrms's simulations.
May simulations using cellular automata and agent-based models explain behavior in
games?  The models and simulations use assumptions that do not hold for people.  They
may seem unrealistic and unable to explain human behavior.  May simulations such as
Skryms's explain human deliberation and cooperation despite their unrealistic
assumptions?
Paul Humphreys (2004: 132) point out a problem with agent-based modeling that
uses only simple local influences on individuals to obtain complex macro phenomena.
He observes, "Because the goal of many agent-based procedures is to find a set of
conditions that is sufficient to reproduce the behavior, rather than to isolate conditions
which are necessary to achieve that result, a misplaced sense of understanding is always a
danger."  As he warns, "It is often possible to recapture observed structural patterns by
using simple models that have nothing to do with the underlying reality" (p. 134).
An argument that a simulation has explanatory power typically shows that the
simulation robustly generates the target phenomenon.  It shows that the simulation
generates the phenomenon even if details of the simulation change.  Skyrms, for example,
supports the explanatory power of his simulations of human interaction by demonstrating
robustness with respect to granularity of options, neighborhoods of interaction, learning
rules, and so on.  Robustness is not enough for explanation, however.  For example, a
nonexplanatory chess program, using brute force instead of pattern recognition, may be
robust with respect to various methods of evaluating prospects.  Robustness is no more
than a part of an adequate standard of explanation.  Also, only certain forms of robustness
are desirable.  A simulation should not robustly yield the same results as it becomes more
and more realistic.  As it replicates additional explanatory factors, results should change.
An adequate explanatory standard specifies the types of robustness a simulation should
achieve.2
The next section presents a standard for a simulation's explanatory success.  The
standard is, roughly, imitation of a natural process.  That requires running a model that
incorporates only explanatory factors.  Later sections argue that Skyrms's models and
simulations incorporate nonexplanatory factors.  That weakens their power to explain
human behavior.  The last section shows that adding strategic reasoning to his models
and simulations increases their explanatory power.
2.  Partial Explanations
                                                 
2 Robert Axlerod (1984) argues that his computer simulations of the repeated prisoner's dilemma explain
the evolution of cooperation.  They illustrate the virtues of the strategy of tit-for-tat.  John Kagel and Alvin
Roth (1995: 29) observe that tit-for-tat's success in those simulations is sensitive to the field of alternative
strategies.  A strong case for tit-for-tat requires showing that it is robustly victorious.
3Ron Giere (1988: Chap. 3) offers an account of the evaluation of models.  To
illustrate his account, he presents Hooke's law together with idealizations for it (pp.
68–70).  The law is not exactly true because the idealizations do not hold for natural
systems (pp. 76–78).  The law belongs to a model, and a model is an idealized system.  A
model does not have the same structure that a natural system has.  It may nonetheless
explain a natural system by being similar to the natural system (pp. 80–81).  This section
refines Giere's standard of evaluation.
There are various types of explanatory success.  One type of success is just
approximating a natural system, as Giere observes.  This section examines another type
of explanatory success, namely, partial explanation.  A partial explanation requires an
exact treatment of some explanatory factors.  A model that merely approximates the
workings of some explanatory factors does not yield a partial explanation.  To yield a
partial explanation, it must treat their workings with precision.
A model may yield a partial explanation despite resting on false assumptions.  Its
assumptions may put aside some explanatory factors to facilitate treatment of other
factors.  The partial explanation it offers is a step forward.  An expansion of the model
may yield a more complete explanation.  I consider whether a model succeeds as a partial
explanation, because enjoying that type of explanatory success facilitates theoretical
progress.
Simulations use simplifying assumptions to make their dynamics manageable.
Reliance on simplifying assumptions is compatible with achieving a partial explanation.
A standard method of building a full theory of a phenomenon starts with a simplified
theory.  Later stages of the method remove simplifying assumptions to make the theory
more general.  A simplified theory has explanatory power as long as its assumptions
control for explanatory factors.  In that case the simplified theory, although not general,
exhibits the workings of remaining explanatory factors and yields a partial explanation.
One may improve a simplified model by making it cover more features of the
phenomenon to be explained in a wider range of cases.  My assessment of models
condones simplifications and just asks for a partial explanation.
Similarity is not necessary for a partial explanation.  Models in game theory and
economics do not achieve similarity.  Their ideal agents are nothing like real agents.  Yet
the models yield partial explanations.  They yield exact accounts of some explanatory
factors after controlling for other explanatory factors.  Also, similarity is not sufficient for
a partial explanation.  A partial explanation treats precisely some factors involved in a
phenomenon's production.  To obtain a standard for a model's success as a partial
explanation, I replace Giere's appeal to similarity with an appeal to a type of
isomorphism.
The previous section noted that theorists argue for a simulation's success by
demonstrating its robustness.  Although robustness is not enough for explanation,
robustness bears on a simulation's success in generating a partial explanation.  Studies of
robustness may show that a simulation responds to an irrelevant feature of a case.  Then
the simulation does not obtain the target phenomenon from explanatory factors.  It fails
as a partial explanation.  Studies of robustness furnish evidence concerning explanatory
power.  May robustness be combined with other criteria to obtain a test of partial
explanation?
4Justin D'Arms, Robert Batterman, and Krzyzstof Górny (1998) present guidelines for
evaluating simulations of human behavior in evolutionary game theory.  They endorse
game theoretic explanations of human behavior that allow us to abstract from misleading
particulars to better recognize and appreciate broad patterns in the phenomena of human
social life.  Their guidelines for assessment of simulations and models of adaptive
behavior are being representative, robust, and flexible (pp. 89–92)).  A model is
representative if its structure is realized frequently in the environment of the evolutionary
adaptation.  A result is robust if it is achieved across a variety of different starting
conditions and/or parameters.  A model for an adaptive strategy is flexible if it presents
processes that various mechanisms may follow to realize the adaptive strategy.
Robustness together with representativeness and flexibility is still not enough for a
partial explanation, however.  To offer a partial explanation, a model must be exactly
right about the explanatory factors it treats.  Robustness, representativeness, and
flexibility are all matters of degree and even when attained to a high degree need not
yield a partial explanation of a phenomenon.  For example, Skyrms's (2004) account of
cooperation in the stag hunt meets those criteria but still does not yield a partial
explanation of cooperation, as Section 4 argues.
A simulation shows the results of assumptions and so resembles a theorem.  I apply to
simulations common methods of evaluating the explanatory power of theorems.  Suppose
that a theorem states a dynamic model's results.  Then the model and a simulation
running it are explanatory only if the theorem is explanatory.  The theorem is explanatory
if its assumptions control for some explanatory factors and its results reveal the workings
of other explanatory factors.  The theorem's proof may show how the theorem's results
arise from its assumptions.3
A simulation may be so complex that no one understands the process by which it
produces results.  There may be no theorem deriving its results from its assumptions.
Nonetheless, the simulation may be explanatory as long as its model is explanatory.  Its
model may be explanatory because its assumptions control for explanatory factors.  One
may establish this despite incomplete information concerning the model's dynamics.
A model may explain the working of some explanatory factors.  It may propose laws
for them that yield a simulation's outcome, even if the details of the process remain
beneath the surface of the simulation.  It is not necessary to have analytic results
confirming the outcome of the simulation.  The model may yield a partial explanation of
a phenomenon without offering a transparent process for production of the phenomenon.
It may succeed by identifying factors that generate the phenomenon in a controlled
environment.
Because the explanatory standards for models and theorems are the same, one may
illustration those standards by applying them to a theorem.  Take Leonard Savage's
(1954) representation theorem showing that, given certain axioms of preference,
probability and utility functions may represent preferences.  Typically, a person's
preferences do not satisfy the axioms.  So how can the theorem explain anything about
people?  To be explanatory, the theorem's assumptions must meet certain conditions.  Not
every theorem resting on simplifying assumptions has explanatory value.  Savage's
theorem uses the assumption that preferences are transitive.  That is a suitable assumption
                                                 
3 As Stephan Hartmann (1996: 84) observes, even when an analytic treatment of a simulation's result is
available, the simulation may still be useful.  It may display the process producing the result.
5because the preferences of a rational ideal agent are transitive.  The theorem also assumes
an infinite number of preferences.  That is an unsuitable assumption because a rational
ideal agent may have only a finite preference structure.  Hence the theorem only partly
meets explanatory standards.
As a theorem's explanatory power depends on its assumptions, the explanatory power
of a simulation also depends on its assumptions, that is, the assumptions of the model it
runs.  Do the assumptions control for explanatory factors?  Are operative factors in the
model isomorphic to operative factors in the target system?  If so, then the model is
explanatory.  Consider, for example, a model of rational decision making for an agent
with full information.  According to the model, the agent maximizes utility.  The model
controls for an explanatory factor, namely, an agent's information.  The remaining
operative factors, namely, the utilities of options, are explanatory.  So, the model
succeeds.  It is explanatory despite the unrealistic assumption of full information because
that assumption controls for a factor in the explanation of a decision's rationality, namely,
the agent's information.  The assumption sets that factor at full information.
Evaluating a model's assumptions for control of explanatory factors requires an
inventory of explanatory factors and methods of controlling them.  Individuation and
identification of explanatory factors is a theoretical enterprise.  Methods of controlling
for them are products of investigation.  A model's evaluation therefore uses hypotheses
about explanatory factors.  An evaluation may be mistaken because it misconceives the
structure of a general theory.  Using a partial theory as a step toward a complete theory is
a boot-strapping procedure.  One uses an outline of the complete theory to guide
construction of the partial theory and also uses the partial theory to guide steps toward the
complete theory.
Assumptions that control for explanatory factors are sometimes called abstractions
and idealizations.  To clarify these assumptions, I compare them with abstractions and
idealizations as Paul Humphreys (2004: 141-47) characterizes those procedures.4
According to Humphreys, abstraction (in one sense) removes some properties without
changing remaining properties.  As he says, "Abstraction1 is the process of omitting
properties or their related predicates from a system or model, the omission process being
either cognitive, representational, or physical, leaving the remaining properties or
predicates unchanged" (p. 143).  As an example of abstraction, he mentions reducing to
zero the Coulomb force between electrons in a model of the atom.5
A model for a phenomenon may use abstraction.  It may remove properties and study
the effect of remaining properties on the target phenomenon.  Removing an explanatory
factor is a way to control for it.  Therefore abstraction resembles adopting assumptions
that control for explanatory factors.6  However removal of a property controls for an
                                                 
4 Weirich (2004) classifies as idealizations all assumptions that control for explanatory factors.  For
simplicity, I put aside that work's terminology for classifying assumptions.
5 Humphreys holds that abstraction increases generality because removing some properties means that
more systems have the remaining properties (p. 146).  Abstraction has an opposite effect on another type of
generality.  Adding assumptions that implement abstraction decreases a model's generality because then
fewer systems satisfy the model's assumptions.
6  Humphreys uses the term "properties" to cover relations, and treats an individual as a bundle of
properties.  Thus abstraction covers a wide range of explanatory factors.  However, he also imposes
restrictions on properties and, for instance, does not assume that if P is a property, then not-P is a property.
His restrictions reduce the range of explanatory factors that abstraction may remove.  To facilitate
6explanatory factor only if the property is an explanatory factor.  Abstraction of a property
does not count as control of an explanatory factor if the property abstracted, say, color,
plays no role in the target phenomenon's production.7
Also, one may control for an explanatory factor not by removing it but by holding it
constant.  For example, one may hold constant an agent's preferences in a series of
decisions.  That step facilitates inferences moving from one decision to another.  This
type of control resembles idealization in Humphreys's sense.  He says, "Idealization
involves taking a property and transforming that property into one that is related to the
original but possesses desirable features which are lacking in the original" (p. 146).  For
example, an idealization may treat the planets as perfect spheres.  It sets shape at a
convenient, constant value.  However, adding a desirable feature does not always control
for an explanatory factor.  For example, some decision principles may treat only decision
problems with finite utility for the sake of mathematical tractability, or to put aside
vexing puzzles about infinite utility.  However, in an account of rational decisions, the
range of the utility scale is not an explanatory factor.  So the assumption of finite utility,
although it introduces a desirable feature, does not control for an explanatory factor.
How does understanding the workings of uncontrolled factors contribute to
understanding the workings of all factors?  May the uncontrolled factors behave
differently when other factors are present?  Explanatory factors carve at the joints.
Although they may interact differently in some respects when more factors are present,
they always obey the same basic laws.  They are the factors for which the basic laws of
interaction are constant.8  Because laws governing explanatory factors are constant, a law
governing uncontrolled factors is an instance of the law governing all factors.  The laws
governing an explanatory model are instances of general laws.  For example, a model of
decision making that assumes full information asserts that agents maximize utility.  A
more general model without that assumption asserts that agents maximize expected
utility.  The principle to maximize utility is an instance of the general principle to
maximize expected utility.  In many cases, being ignorant of general laws, one cannot
verify that a model's law is an instance of a general law.  However, an outline of a general
law may support a judgment that a model's law is an instance.
A model whose assumptions control for explanatory factors offers a partial
explanation because it is isomorphic to a natural system.  Suppose that a natural system
has three components, and a model controls for one component to investigate the
remaining two components.  Some aspects of the interaction of the remaining
components may be altered by the absence of the one removed.  To be explanatory, a
type of isomorphism must nonetheless hold between the model and the natural system.
Suppose that the law for the two-component model asserts that Rab and the law for the
three-component system asserts that Sabc.  The relevant type of isomorphism holds if the
first law is an instance of the second law.
                                                                                                                                                  
comparison of abstraction and control of explanatory factors, I assume that explanatory factors are
properties.
7 Because removing a property is vague, it is best to use an assumption to state the manner of the property's
removal.  For example, to remove the property of friction, one may assume that objects are frictionless.  I
do not assume that under assumptions removing properties, remaining properties are completely
unaffected.  Abstracting away cognitive limits changes an agent's inferential power, for example.
8 Whether such factors exist is an empirical matter, but theoretical science searches for them under the
working hypothesis that they exist.
7An isomorphism between a model and a natural system may serve various purposes.
Van Fraassen (1980: 64) uses such an isomorphism as a test of a theory's empirical
adequacy.  He says, "To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models;
and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as
candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena.  The structures which
can be described in experimental and measurement reports we can call appearances: the
theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are
isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model."  Van Fraassen means by model an
interpretation of a formal theory that makes the theory true.  This sense of model differs
from but is similar to the sense of model in which a simulation runs a model.
The type of isomorphism between model and natural system that van Fraassen
considers resembles the type of isomorphism that generates explanatory power.  However
an explanatory isomorphism has special features.  First, it does not involve individuals
because their interactions in nature are not the same as in the model.  Instead, it involves
explanatory factors and their interaction.  The explanatory factors are the same in the
model and in the natural system.  Second, the isomorphism preserves the laws governing
the explanatory factors.  The law governing their interaction in the model is an instance
of the law governing their interaction in the natural system.  These relationships establish
an explanatory isomorphism between the model and the natural system.
An isomorphism involving properties and their interaction may not establish
explanatory power.  A model and a natural system may involve properties, a single law of
the model, and a single law of the natural system.  If the law of the model and the law of
the natural system are both true, then the model is isomorphic to the natural system under
the identity function from properties in the model to properties in the natural system.  An
explanatory isomorphism requires in addition that the properties be explanatory factors
and that the law of the model be an instance of a law of the natural system.  A partial
explanation requires a particular type of isomorphism between a model and a natural
system.  The model must capture the right structures in the right ways.  The elements
must be explanatory factors, and their relation in the model must be an instance of their
relation in the natural system.
The model earlier taken from decision theory exhibits the required type of
isomorphism.  The elements of the model are the properties of being an agent with a
decision problem, having a utility assignment for options in the problem, and maximizing
utility in the problem with respect to the options' utility assignments.  The law governing
the properties in the model states that an agent maximizes utility.  This is an instance of
the general law relating the properties in a natural system where agents may lack full
information.  The general law states that an agent maximizes expected utility and that an
option's expected utility equals its utility.9
3.  Simulation of Interactive Deliberations
A simulation represents a process.  The moves in a simultaneous-move game do not
constitute a process, but the deliberations of agents do.  A simulation may replicate their
deliberations.  This section evaluates Brian Skyrms's (1990: Chap. 2) simulations of
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8deliberations in simultaneous-move, noncooperative games.  Those simulations aim to
explain the emergence of a Nash equilibrium.  Skryms derives a Nash equilibrium’s
realization from principles for agents with bounded rationality.  This section argues that
because the derivation excessively restricts the agents’ cognitive abilities, it does not
explain why people realize a Nash equilibrium in a game of strategy.
As Skyrms envisages agents, they deliberate in stages instead of all at once.  They use
the results of one stage of deliberation as additional information for the next stage.
Because agents in games of strategy try to take account of each other’s deliberations, the
results of an agent’s deliberation in one stage often provide evidence about other agents’
strategies.  The agent can then use this evidence in his deliberation’s next stage.
An agent begins deliberation with an initial assignment of probabilities to his
strategies and those of other agents.  Using the probabilities for others’ strategies, he
finds a strategy for himself that maximizes expected utility.  Typically, he then increases
that strategy’s probability.  He does not increase its probability all the way to one because
he is aware that his probability assignments are tentative.  They do not accommodate all
relevant considerations, so he expects revisions as his deliberations proceed.  Next, the
agent revises his probability assignment for other agents’ strategies in light of his new
probability assignment for his own strategies.  Then using the revised probabilities, he
recalculates the expected utilities of his own strategies and readjusts their probabilities.
The process of revision uses each stage of deliberation as input for a rule of bounded
rationality that brings the agent to the next stage.  This process continues until the
probabilities of the agent’s strategies do not lead to any further revision in his probability
assignment for other agents’ strategies.  When all the agents reach this stopping point,
they achieve a joint deliberational equilibrium.  In suitable conditions this joint
deliberational equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates a possible course of deliberations in the game of Matching
Pennies.  In that game two agents simultaneously display pennies, one seeking a match in
the sides displayed and the other a mismatch.  In Figure 1, Agent 1 seeks a match and
Agent 2 seeks a mismatch.  The agents know each other’s initial probability assignments
and updating rules so that they know each other’s probability assignments at every stage
of deliberations.  Deliberations start with each agent assigning a probability of slightly
more than 0 to playing Heads.  Agent 2 then starts to increase the probability of Heads,
seeking a mismatch.  After the probability of Agent 2’s playing Heads exceeds 0.5, Agent
1 begins to increase the probability of Heads also, seeking to obtain a match.  When the
probability of his playing Heads exceeds 0.5, Agent 2 begins to decrease the probability
of Heads.  Mutual adjustment of probability assignments leads to the joint deliberational
equilibrium in which each agent settles on the mixed strategy of playing Heads and Tails
with equal probability.  Their mixed strategies form a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 1
In games with multiple Nash equilibria, the equilibrium reached depends on the
agents' initial probability assignments (p. 34).  Although the dynamics do not explain the
particular equilibrium reached, Skyrms holds that they explain why deliberations
culminate in a Nash equilibrium.  He shows a theorem with the following form.  Under
certain assumptions, “A joint deliberational equilibrium on the part of all the players
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium point of the game” (p. 29).  This result has intrinsic
interest because it shows how a Nash equilibrium in a game may arise from the agents’
deliberations.  However, the assumptions on which it rests are too restrictive to yield a
partial explanation of a Nash equilibrium's realization.
Skyrms’s theorem shows that given certain assumptions, rational agents reach a joint
deliberational equilibrium if and only if they reach a Nash equilibrium.  But the
theorem’s assumptions provide no guarantee that the agents reach a joint deliberational
equilibrium.  Under the assumptions, whether the agents reach a joint deliberational
equilibrium depends on their initial probabilities and their rules for revising probabilities.
For instance, agents who revise probabilities using a noncontinuous rule may not reach a
joint deliberational equilibrium even though one exists.  They may skip over it (p. 32).
Furthermore, in the game of Matching Pennies “Aristotelian” deliberators, who revise
probability assignments according the continuous rule dp(H)/dt = EU(H) – EU(T), may
fail to reach a joint deliberational equilibrium (pp. 80–81).  Given almost every initial
probability assignment, they circle the 50–50 mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as in
Figure 2.  Because the theorem’s assumptions do not guarantee a joint deliberational
equilibrium, the theorem provides at best only a partial explanation of realization of a
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In Skyrms’s model of deliberation agents reach a Nash equilibrium by adjusting their
probability assignments in light of their knowledge of other agents’ probability
assignments (p. 33).  This is a type of strategic reasoning, but even short-sighted agents
may exercise it.  In characterizing the deliberators in his examples he says, “These
players follow their noses in the direction of the current apparent good, with no real
memory of where they have been, no capability of recognizing patterns, and no sense of
where they are going” (p. 152).  His model does not require that the deliberators be as
simple-minded as this, but the explanation of Nash equilibrium he gives succeeds for
such deliberators.  As he observes (pp. 58, 152), his model of deliberation resembles the
evolutionary models of animal behavior proposed by John Maynard Smith (1982).  It
does not require looking ahead to future stages.  It has a dynamics suited to mindless
organisms as well as humans.
Skyrms’s model of deliberation for agents with bounded rationality is obviously
useful in applications of game theory to humans.  Also, it is clear that his theorem
exposes an interesting connection between joint deliberational equilibrium and Nash
equilibrium.  The significance of this connection is moreover supported by his
investigations of its robustness (pp. 62–86).  However, the theorem’s assumptions have
several drawbacks with respect to the project of obtaining a partial explanation of
realization of a Nash equilibrium.  For theoretical appeal, the assumptions should control
for factors that explain rational behavior.  This section argues that the theorem’s
assumptions fall short with respect to that standard.
The theorem’s assumptions appear in this summary: “In a game played by Bayesian
deliberators with a common prior, an adaptive rule that seeks the good, and a feedback
process that updates by emulation, with common knowledge of all the foregoing, each
player is at a deliberational equilibrium at a state of the system if and only if the
assignment of the default mixed acts to each player constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
game” (p. 33).  A common prior is a common initial assignment of probabilities to all the
strategies of all the players.  An adaptive rule that seeks the good revises the probabilities
of an agent’s strategies, after calculations of their expected utilities, so that only strategies
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with a higher expected utility than the agent’s tentative mixed strategy receive a higher
probability and so that the sum of the probabilities of such strategies increases.  A
feedback process that updates by emulation revises the probabilities assigned to other
agents’ strategies by replicating their revision procedures.  Common knowledge of the
process of deliberation entails that all know it, know that all know it, and so on.  The
default mixed act of a player is the randomized strategy that follows the agent’s current
assignment of probabilities to his pure strategies.
Taking Skyrms’s theorem as an explanation of realization of a Nash equilibrium in a
game of strategy, the role of an assumption is either to facilitate the attainment of joint
deliberational equilibrium or to bring joint deliberational equilibrium into alignment with
Nash equilibrium.  My evaluation of the theorem's assumptions examines the way in
which they fulfill these roles.
The first drawback is that some of the assumptions do not control for factors that
explain rational behavior.  To show that an assumption fails this test without advancing
an inventory of factors that explain rational behavior, I show that modifying the
assumption in a way that has no significance according to a general theory of rationality
(insofar as its contours are known) either blocks joint deliberational equilibrium or else
upsets the alignment of joint deliberational equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
Some assumptions meet the standard of evaluation.  Take the common knowledge
assumption.  It controls an explanatory factor, namely, each agent’s knowledge about
others.  Clearly, a general theory of rational behavior uses this factor to help explain
rational behavior in strategic situations.  Likewise, the assumption of a common prior, in
the context of the common knowledge assumption, controls each agent’s knowledge
about others.
The other assumptions, however, lack this sort of theoretical warrant.  Take the
assumption that all agents have the same adaptive rule for revision of probabilities.
Because, as Skyrms allows, many adaptive rules are rational, this assumption does not
control for an explanatory factor.  Also, consider the assumption that the adaptive rule
seeks the good.  This assumption excludes adaptive rules that permit raising the
probabilities of strategies that are just as good as one’s tentative mixed strategy.  Because
probability increases of this sort are not irrational, excluding adaptive rules that permit
them does not control for an explanatory factor.
Moreover, the exclusion of the permissive adaptive rules is not merely a matter of
technical convenience.  It is necessary for the correspondence between deliberational and
Nash equilibrium.  To see this, consider a game with a unique Nash equilibrium that is
not strict.  Given a permissive adaptive rule, the agents may be at a Nash equilibrium but
not achieve joint deliberational equilibrium.  They may oscillate away from and back to
the Nash equilibrium until lack of time forces them to halt deliberations, perhaps away
from the Nash equilibrium.
The assumption that the agents update by emulation is also nonexplanatory.
According to it, an agent’s stage n deliberations about others replicate their stage n
deliberations.  It has the consequence that an agent learns about others’ stage n
deliberations during his stage n deliberations.  But this feature of an agent’s learning
lacks theoretical motivation.  Why should an agent learn about others’ stage n
deliberations during his stage n deliberations as opposed to his stage n – 1 or n + 1
deliberations?  The symmetry of the agents’ situations does not require their learning to
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be in step with deliberations rather than a step behind or ahead.  It requires only that each
agent’s learning follow the same pattern.  Rationality, although it requires gathering
information about others, does not require that agents in stage n deliberations gather
information about others by replicating their stage n deliberations as opposed to their
stage n – 1 or n + 1 deliberations.  Because predictions about others are subject to
revision in later stages of deliberation, they need not stem from replications of any
particular stage.
However, the timing of information about others is critical for the attainment of a
joint deliberational equilibrium.  Suppose that in a two-person game, one agent's learning
about the other agent falls a step behind the other agent's deliberations.  It is as if the
agents take turns going through the stages of deliberation.  Then a joint deliberational
equilibrium may move out of reach.  In the game of Matching Pennies, for instance, each
agent may end up oscillating perpetually between two mixed acts.  When Agent 1, who
wants a match, learns of an increase in the probability of Heads for his opponent, he
raises the probability of his playing Heads.  Then, when Agent 2 learns of this change,
she lowers the probability of her playing Heads.  This triggers a decrease in the
probability of Agent 1’s playing Heads, and so on.  As a result, the agents do not reach
the mixed acts that constitute deliberational and Nash equilibrium.  They trace a box
around the Nash equilibrium as in Figure 3 until time for deliberation ends.
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1p(H) for agent 2
p(H) for agent 1
Figure 3
Do Skyrms's simulations of joint deliberations partially explain realization of a Nash
equilibrium?  As shown, not all assumptions control for explanatory factors.  Although
assumptions about timing are critical, they do not control for an explanatory factor.  The
outcomes people achieve in simultaneous-move, noncooperative games do not depend on
the timing of their deliberations.  The simulations should be robust with respect to
assumptions about the timing of agents' deliberations but are not robust.  Thus, Skyrms's
simulations of interactive deliberations do not generate partial explanations of a Nash
equilibrium's realization.  Section 5 proposes modifying the dynamics of Skyrms's
simulations to mitigate the effect of timing on attainment of an equilibrium.
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4.  Simulation of Behavioral Evolution
Skyrms (2004) offers computer simulations to explain the emergence of cooperation.
The simulations run evolutionary dynamics that yield cooperative behavior.  To the basic
replicator dynamics, he adds various ways for organisms to interact with their neighbors
in a population.  His simulations use the stag hunt as the paradigm problem of
cooperation and show how a population may reach an efficient equilibrium despite
obstacles such as risk.  They also treat coordination in the game divide-the-dollar.  His
simulations apply to many types of organism, but this section examines their application
to people only.  It asks whether the simulations explain human behavior.
Cultural evolution and genetic evolution both yield evolution of behavior.  Models of
cultural evolution use the replicator dynamics applied to behavior rather than to genes.
Skryms takes this approach and so simulates cultural evolution (p. 10).  His target is
cultural evolution of cooperation and also the speed of cooperation's emergence.
Part I of Skyrms's book presents the simulations I treat.  Other parts modify those
simulations to facilitate cooperation.  I do not review the modifications.  My objective is
just to illustrate evaluation of a simulation, and the simulations in Part I furnish good
examples.  Also, the book's modifications of those simulations do not rectify the
explanatory shortcomings that this section identifies.
In the preface Skyrms says of his book, "Each part isolates a simple empirically
motivated modification of the most thoroughly studied evolutionary model and shows
how the modification makes a dramatic difference in the evolutionary dynamics of the
stag hunt and related interactions" (p. xiii).  The responsiveness of models to simple
modifications highlights a question about explanatory power.  Does a model explain
cooperation if simple modifications make a dramatic difference?  Skyrms believes that
the simulations explain the emergence of cooperation (p. 123).  He supports his claim by
studying robustness of results.  However, changes in some nonexplanatory factors
influence results.  Changes in those factors do not affect results among people but do
affect results among agents in the model.  That lack of robustness shows that the factors
controlling results in the model are not the factors controlling results in the world.  The
model's assumptions do not control for explanatory factors, and so the model does not
yield a partial explanation of cooperation.
Skyrms controls for some explanatory factors governing the emergence of
cooperation, such as incentives to exploit cooperators.  He controls for these incentives
by addressing the stag hunt rather than the prisoner's dilemma and by adjusting the payoff
matrix of the stag hunt.
Because the stag hunt is the game that Skyrms treats most fully, I start with it.  This
two-person noncooperative game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies.  One is
efficient, and the other is not efficient.  The stag hunt has a rewarding but risky
equilibrium, namely, stag hunting.  It also has a risk-free equilibrium, namely, hare
hunting.  Various payoff matrices realize the stag hunt.  One matrix is this.
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 4, 4 0, 3
Defect 3, 0 1, 1
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With the standard replicator dynamics, the basin of attraction for cooperation drives a
population with at least 75% cooperators to cooperation (p. 11).  Chance may bounce a
population from one equilibrium to another.  Without chance, a population of hare
hunters is stuck with hare hunting despite its inefficiency.
In Chapter 3, Skyrms treats the stag hunt in a population organized into
neighborhoods of interaction.  In that analysis, the stag hunt has this payoff matrix.
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3, 3 0, 2
Defect 2, 0 2, 2
Defecting, or hunting hare, is a risk-dominant equilibrium in the sense that given equi-
probability of strategies, defecting maximizes expected utility.  Models for this game
differ in their dynamics.  Glenn Ellison's (1993) dynamics use a best-response updating
rule, and Jason Alexander's (2000) dynamics use an imitate-the-best updating rule.  Also,
models differ in type of interaction with neighbors.  Interaction may occur in a one- or
two-dimensional neighborhood, for example.  Interaction with neighbors speeds
attainment of an equilibrium, but whether the efficient equilibrium evolves depends on
details of the interaction.  Imitating the most successful neighbor in a two-dimensional
neighborhood tends to yield the efficient equilibrium, whereas adopting a best response
to an anticipated act of a neighbor in a one-dimensional neighborhood tends to yield the
inefficient equilibrium (pp. 31–32).  Skyrms summarizes results this way: "Local
interaction opens up possibilities of cooperation that do not exist in a more traditional
setting, and imitation dynamics is often more conducive to cooperation than best-
response dynamics" (p. 41).
The equilibrium's sensitivity to the details of interaction raises questions about the
explanatory power of the simulations.  Such details do not seem to affect the emergence
of cooperation among people.  People engaged in the stag hunt do not reveal a similar
sensitivity to types of neighborhood.  The model's sensitivity to those types shows that its
results rest on assumptions about nonexplanatory factors.  The model therefore does not
yield a partial explanation of cooperation.
In Chapter 2, Skyrms studies the evolution of the norm of equity in a two-agent
division of a windfall.  The game studied is called divide-the-dollar.  It is not a bargaining
problem because the agents do not communicate.  The game is a simultaneous-move,
noncooperative game, in particular, a coordination problem.  Each agent simultaneously
submits a bid and then receives a portion of the dollar available only if the sum of their
bids is less than or equal to a dollar.  Each obtains his demand in that case.  To make the
game tractable, Skyrms limits an agent's options to demand 1/3, demand 1/2, and demand
2/3.  Then he studies robustness of results with respect to granularity among options.
Suppose that the members of a population interact in random fashion.  Then demand
1/2 is the only evolutionarily stable strategy.  If the whole population follows it, mutant
strategies cannot take over.  However, half the population's demanding 1/3 and the other
half's demanding 2/3 makes a stable polymorphism (p. 20).  Next, suppose that strategies'
probabilities increase in proportion to their success and vary a bit by chance.  Then fair-
division is the uniquely stochastically stable equilibrium (pp. 22–23).  It is the highest
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probability evolutionarily stable strategy, and a population spends most of its time with it
despite the possibility of a stable polymorphism.
Skyrms's account of the emergence of fair division in divide-the-dollar summarizes
results of Alexander and Skryms (1999) and Alexander (2000).  Those articles descend
from Skyrms (1996) and respond to criticisms from D'Arms, Batterman, and Górny
(1998).
Skyrms's (1996) model for the emergence of fair division in divide-the-dollar
introduces correlation of strategies of agents playing the game.  D'Arms et al. object to
assuming correlation without specifying a mechanism to generate it.  An evolutionary
account of behavior may fail, they observe, because it abstracts away crucial details of
the particular ecologies and ontogenies of the creatures whose behavior it seeks to
explain (p. 82).  They ask for a particularist account of the evolution of behavior that
identifies the mechanism that produces the behavior to be explained.  "Selective pressures
deriving from the fitness consequences of various social relations such as cooperation,
reciprocity, coalition building, and competition for social status, have forged similarly
specific adaptive psychological mechanisms which mediate cognition and motivation in
these domains" (p. 84).  They are dissatisfied with Skryms's account of the emergence of
fair division because it is a generalist account.  It just identifies gains from correlation of
strategies without explaining how organisms achieve that correlation.  An explanation of
some behavior should identify a mechanism that produces the behavior and not just
appeal to the advantages of the behavior.  They ask for the mechanism that generates
correlation of strategies in divide-the-dollar.  They find no evidence of a genetic
mechanism that yields the correlation.  Moreover, assuming a genetic mechanism
sacrifices flexibility.  It precludes a cultural mechanism that uses teaching or competition
for the allegiance of rational deliberators.
Skyrms shows that fair division emerges in a variety of ways in a variety of
circumstances.  But D'Arms et al. hold that robustness is not enough to explain fair
division.  To flesh out an evolutionary model of behavior, they assume rational
deliberators, substitute a best-response dynamics for Skyrms's imitation dynamics, and
allow agents to seek out partners for interaction.  Their model does not support
correlation of strategies.  In fact, it yields anti-correlation of strategies because those who
demand 2/3 seek out those who demand 1/3.  With anti-correlation, the demand 1/3 and
demand 2/3 polymorphism reemerges.  They conclude that Skyrms's model is not
sufficiently flexible and robust to explain fair division because adding some realistic
features brings back the inequitable polymorphism (p. 98).
Alexander (2000) defends Skyrms's (1996) appeal to correlation of strategies.  To
Skrym's model, he adds a mechanism of correlation, namely, interaction in a fixed
neighborhood.  The addition of neighborhoods not only correlates strategies but also
makes fair division relatively independent of a population's initial mix of strategies.
Almost every initial mix is in the basin of attraction for fair division.  Justice is
contagious given neighborhoods.
Skryms (2004: Chap. 2) adopts the spatial model of interaction to improve his
original model for fair division.  In the new model, correlation of strategies arises from
imitation of successful neighbors rather than from genetic influence.  For instance,
suppose that agents adopt the most successful strategy in their neighborhood.  Then fair
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random members of a population yields fair division as an equilibrium after, on average,
46 generations.  However, an agent's bargaining with neighbors yields the same
equilibrium after, on average, only 16 generations.  Rapid fixation of fair division occurs
because of neighborhoods and not because of the type of imitation.  If instead of imitating
the best strategy, an agent imitates strategies with probabilities in proportion to their
success rates, fair division still emerges rapidly (p. 26).  A dynamics with neighborhoods
yields the target phenomenon, namely, fair division plus the speed of its emergence,
better than a dynamics with random interaction does.
Despite improvements, Skyrms's model still does not offer a partial explanation of
fair division.  The model is not robust with respect to nonexplanatory factors.  The
model's results depend on its rule for updating behavior.  In particular, the results depend
on the updating's being synchronic, as Alexander (2000: 507) notes.  This sensitivity to
timing is nonexplanatory because among people the timing of interaction does not make a
difference.  Moreover, results about the speed of fair division's emergence depend on the
size of neighborhoods, as Alexander (pp. 507–10) shows.  The size of neighborhoods of
interaction is not an explanatory factor, and variations concerning it should not matter to
cooperation's emergence.  People playing divide-the-dollar adopt a 50-50 split
immediately without any apparent sensitivity to the size of neighborhoods of interaction.
To succeed as a partial explanation, a model's assumptions must control for
explanatory factors only.  Some features of Skyrms's models of coordination and
cooperation are not explanatory.  Despite other successes, those models do not yield
partial explanations of the emergence of fair division and stag hunting.  The next section
considers how to remedy this problem.
5.  Incorporating Strategic Reasoning
Skyrms's simulations reach solutions to games using limited resources.  In particular,
they do not use strategic reasoning.  Although the simulations' power is remarkable,
realism about human behavior requires adding strategic reasoning.  Explanations of
human behavior should include strategic reasoning because people use it.
A model may adjust to the type of population it treats.  For people, it may incorporate
reasoning that governs their interactions.  An agent's response to others need not be
simple imitation but may involve strategic reasoning.  A model's dynamics may allow for
that reasoning.  This section suggests adding strategic reasoning to the models Skyrms's
simulations run, at least, when they target human behavior in games of strategy.
Chapter 7 of Skryms's book adds some strategic reasoning to the models earlier
chapters present.  He says, "Let us equip our agents with a little bit of strategic thinking.
Now, when an agent revises her strategy, she chooses a best response to the strategy she
has last encountered. …  Best-response to the last strategy encountered is related to best-
response to some more or less sophisticated inductive estimate of what strategy you are
likely to encounter" (p. 107).  The type of best-response dynamics Skyrms introduces is a
very simplified form of strategic reasoning.  Why not add more sophisticated reasoning?
Perhaps reluctance arises because people have only bounded rationality.  Building in
sophisticated reasoning may not yield an explanation of behavior.  Also, decision-
theoretic support for solutions to games is a research project.  Standard principles of
rationality such as utility maximization do not explain realization of a Nash equilibrium.
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The replicator dynamics generates a Nash equilibrium more straightforwardly than
strategic reasoning does.  Models may resolve these problems concerning bounded
rationality and the theory of rationality by introducing realistic forms of strategic
reasoning and by investigating forms of strategic reasoning that lead to appropriate types
of equilibrium.
A dynamics for strategic reasoning should include an agent's estimation of other
agents' strategies, and that estimation should acknowledge their strategies' dependence on
their estimation of his strategy.  The interactive nature of strategic reasoning generates
equilibria, and some equilibria are more efficient than others are.  The dynamics should
add the global influence of strategic reasoning to the local influence of agents on each
other.  Alexander (2000: 502–03) describes a sort of global influence that may help
explain the emergence of fair division.  He observes, "If demand half is a stochastically
robust strategy and A knows this, A knows that the strategy of fair division will shortly
dominate the population.  This provides a strong incentive for A to demand half, since,
given A's expectation that fair division will shortly dominate the population, demand half
is the strategy which will maximize A's amount of cake when fair division comes to
dominate."  While respecting bounded rationality, a model may incorporate such global
influences on behavior.
How should models and simulations incorporate strategic reasoning?  If one builds a
model in which agents above all else want to cooperate, then cooperation emerges easily.
For a deeper-going explanation, one may add features that explain why people want to
cooperate.  The target phenomenon may include more than cooperation.  It may include
the desire to cooperate.  The general goal is to explain actions by individuals that yield
cooperation in a group.  Additions to the dynamics are not ad hoc as long as they concern
individuals rather than the whole group.
Realism requires giving agents no more reasoning power than they have, but a
model's explanatory goals may not require realism in all matters.  A model with
simplifying assumptions may yield a partial explanation if it replicates some factors
explaining human behavior.  A model incorporating reasoning may use abstraction and
idealization to simplify its treatment of reasoning.  More realistic models may later
rescind those abstractions and idealizations.
Incorporating strategic reasoning may alter the target phenomenon.  Models that
incorporate reasoning may seek explanations of rational behavior.  Such explanations
amount to justifications of behavior.  Idealized forms of strategic reasoning fit this
project.  A model may explain how rational behavior emerges from strategic reasoning.
A model with a normative objective may be used to improve human behavior.  If the
model is appropriate for people with bounded rationality, then it may also explain
behavior because people are rational by and large.
Moving to an explanation of rational behavior has some advantages.  It enhances the
prospect of obtaining a partial explanation.  Because it is hard to treat empirical systems
with precision, it is hard to obtain a partial explanation of human behavior.  A treatment
of rational behavior, being normative, may attain the type of precision that logic attains.
One may evaluate a model of rational behavior as one evaluates a theorem.  The model
may treat reasons with precision.  A priori judgments may confirm that the model's
assumptions control for explanatory factors only and that the model accurately handles
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remaining explanatory factors.  The shift from descriptive to normative models thus
facilitates confirmation of explanatory success.
This section proposes using strategic reasoning to promote explanation of rational
behavior.  One explanatory objective is an individualistic account of the rationality of
participation in a Nash equilibrium.  Skyrms uses individualistic factors to obtain a Nash
equilibrium, but his assumptions are not explanatory, as Section 3 argued.  This section
considers how to modify those assumptions so that they better serve explanatory
purposes.  Another explanatory objective is an individualistic account of the rationality of
coordination and cooperation in games such as divide-the-dollar and the stag hunt.
Skryms's simulations use individualistic factors to obtain fair division and to select an
efficient equilibrium.  His assumptions are not explanatory, however, as Section 4
argued.
First, consider adding strategic reasoning to Skyrms's deliberational dynamics.  Those
dynamics attempt only to explain realization of a Nash equilibrium and do not attempt to
explain realization of a particular Nash equilibrium.  In games with multiple equilibria,
the equilibrium realized depends on the agents' initial probability assignments to the
strategies of other agents.  Models that incorporate strategic reasoning may explain the
realization of a particular Nash equilibrium, for example, an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Adding strategic reasoning gives agents foresight.  They can look ahead to see where
their initial probability assignments will take them.  Then they can reason their way to
probability assignments that will take them to an efficient Nash equilibrium.  Adding
strategic reasoning eliminates an equilibrium's dependence on the agents' initial position
in the deliberational dynamics.  They need not fall by chance into the equilibrium's basin
of attraction.  A simulation incorporating strategic reasoning is robust with respect to the
nonexplanatory factor of initial position.
Strategic reasoning also adds robustness with respect to the timing of the agents'
deliberations.  Adding strategic reasoning swamps out the affects of timing.  Agents
assess the direction of their current deliberations and make adjustments so that their
deliberations end well.  The agents may independently make adjustments at various
stages of their deliberations.  They may identify the equilibria of their game, and an
efficient equilibrium may be a focal point of their reasoning.
Next, consider cultural evolution in the game divide-the-dollar and in the stag hunt.
The key to fair division and stag hunting is correlation of strategies.  Skyrms's
mechanism for achieving it is a neighborhood of interaction.  His dynamics use imitation
of successful strategies in the neighborhood.  Adding strategic reasoning alters the
dynamics.  Justification of cooperation requires a best-response dynamics rather than an
imitation dynamics.  Imitation of success sounds rational, but those succeeding may be
cooperators in a prisoner's dilemma.  Then imitation of their success yields an irrational
strategy.  Adding strategic reasoning also introduces interaction of strategic
considerations.  Strategic reasoners may use focal points to coordinate in divide-the-
dollar and to reach the efficient equilibrium in the stag hunt.  As a result, cooperation
becomes robust with respect to types of neighborhoods.  Given that agents see the
advantages of stag hunting, it does not matter whether they are interacting in one-
dimensional or two-dimensional neighborhoods.  It is as if the neighborhoods of learning
and interaction were distinguished, and as if the neighborhood of learning were the whole
population.
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In Skyrms's model of cooperation, the equilibrium a simulation achieves in a game
with multiple equilibria depends on the population's starting point and on the chance
events that make a population jump from one basin of attraction to another basin of
attraction.  Strategic reasoning replaces initial conditions and chance as a means of
settling the equilibrium reached.  Strategic reasoners are not dependent on the
population's starting point or chance perturbations.
A simulation needs features handling initial conditions, type of interaction, and
dynamics.  Given strategic reasoning, results are robust with respect to changes in those
features.  Because agents look for an efficient equilibrium and take steps to attain it, the
details of their starting position and local interaction are not important.  A simulation
gains explanatory power if its results are robust with respect to changes in these
nonexplanatory factors.
Furthermore, in Skyrms's model, because basins of attraction govern a population's
path toward an equilibrium, and because chance moves a population from one basin to
another, the emergence of a desirable equilibrium may be a relatively slow process.  It
may take a large number of mutants to shift a population from one basin to another, and,
normally, it takes a long time for a large number of mutants to occur together.  Strategic
reasoning works faster than chance does.  Adding strategic reasoning to simulations of
human behavior increases the speed of cooperation's emergence.  A dynamics with
strategic reasoning accelerates emergence of cooperation in both divide-the-dollar and the
stag hunt.  A simulation with strategic reasoning yields fair division rapidly in divide-the-
dollar because fair division is a focal point.  Adding strategic reasoning increases the
speed of reaching the efficient equilibrium in the stag hunt because stag hunting is also a
focal point.  Increasing the speed of cooperation's emergence has explanatory value
because the target phenomenon includes the pace of cooperation's emergence, which is
rapid among people.
My account of the role of strategic reasoning appeals to focal points.  A simulation
may aim to explain focal points rather than lean directly on them.  Michael Bacharach
(2006) explains focal points using the psychological framing of decision problems.
Simulations may incorporate his methods.  Then the relevant period for cooperation's
emergence includes the period for emergence of the pertinent focal point.  Strategic
reasoning may accelerate emergence of a focal point, too.  Fair division is a sustainable
practice, and stag hunting is an efficient equilibrium.  These considerations draw
attention to those equilibria and speed their emergence as focal points.
Finally, I consider a game where the prospects for cooperation are especially bleak,
namely, the prisoner's dilemma.  Skryms (2004) treats this game, too.  He notes that some
spatial models with correlation of strategies, such as the haystack model, may support
cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (pp. 6–8).  Nonetheless, only defection is rational,
so a best-response dynamics yields defection (p. 41).  Doesn't adding strategic reasoning
to a model diminish the prospects for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma?
One way to improve prospects for cooperation is to move from the one-shot prisoner's
dilemma to repeated prisoner's dilemmas.  Repetition, of course, changes the game
because choices in one game may affect outcomes in later games.  Repeated prisoner's
dilemmas create a stag hunt, as Skryms observes (pp. 4–5), and cooperation in the stag
hunt is achievable.
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Adding strategic reasoning also creates a new, related mechanism for escaping the
prisoner's dilemma.  Strategic reasoners may change the form of their interaction.  That
is, they may change the game they are playing.  They may alter their social institutions.
The prisoner's dilemma involves agents who cannot communicate.  They may escape
from the dilemma if they can communicate.  As John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten
(1988: 4) observe, if agents can communicate, then one agent may offer to cooperate on
condition that the other agent does.  The other agent may then cooperate.  The conditional
offer and positive response constitute a roll back equilibrium of a sequential game
underlying the prisoner's dilemma.  Participating in the rollback equilibrium is rational
for each player.  People may foresee the results of changing a prisoner's dilemma to allow
for conditional offers and responses.  Liking the results, they may make the change.
Strategic reasoning not only applies within a game but also guides selection of games
to play.  Strategic reasoners may anticipate the results of the game they are playing and
may alter the game to achieve better results.  Humans may change the context of their
interactions by changing their social institutions.  They may replace a social institution
with a new institution in which people pursuing incentives achieve an equilibrium better
than one they achieve by pursuing incentives in the old institution.  Human control of
social structure is a means of reaching cooperation faster than the replicator dynamics
reaches it, even when interaction with neighbors enriches that dynamics.  To explain
human cooperation, especially the speed of its emergence, a simulation should
incorporate the reasoning of agents and its influence on social structure.
Models and simulations of cooperative human behavior gain explanatory power by
incorporating strategic reasoning.  Strategic reasoning introduces a type of global
dynamics that improves robustness.  Although humans have only bounded rationality,
their strategic reasoning moves them rapidly toward efficient equilibria and toward
beneficial changes in social structure.  Skyrms's models and simulations are not
completely successful in providing partial explanations of human cooperation, but adding
strategic reasoning remedies that problem.
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